The Myth of Confidence: Examining the Forgotten Virtue of Courage through Psychoanalytic Lenses

One will no doubt recall that Freud’s reading of Hamlet has the eponymous prince in the thrall of indecisiveness stemming from unresolved feelings toward his mother, Queen Gertrude, and animosity towards his uncle, King Claudius—we are told the Oedipal complex paralyses young Hamlet.^[1]Shakespeare’s great tragedy, published in the First Folio of 1623, offers a compelling case study for introducing psychoanalytic perspectives on constructs such as confidence and courage. Hamlet is plainly a masterpiece of literature that immerses the reader in a holographic representation of its protagonist’s psyche. The vicissitudes between action and inaction, the internal dialogues, and the ambivalent quest to avenge his father’s murder reverberate differently through the lenses of Alfred Adler, Adam Phillips, and Karen Horney. These perspectives offer valuable insights into the lead character’s emotional struggles and psychological conflicts, making Hamlet a cosmopolitan work of art. A core tenet in Adler’s psychoanalytic theory is that overcoming feelings of profound inferiority, inadequacy, and self-doubt is essential for developing genuine confidence and self-assurance.^[2] Hamlet’s renowned soliloquy in Act 3, Scene 1 delves into his descent into existential dread and introspection. He struggles with profound inquiries about life and death, the merits of action versus inaction, and the vicious nature of excessive contemplation:

‘Thus conscience does make cowards of us all, / And thus the native hue of resolution / Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, / And enterprises of great pith and moment / With this regard their currents turn awry, / And lose the name of action.’ 

Here the rent prince laments that his cowardice is affirmed by over-determinations of conscience and jaundiced further by tides of hesitancy. In Adlerian terms, this marks Hamlet’s nadir of overwhelming inferiority, destroying his confidence to face the world or carry out filial or royal duties. According to Adler, such shattering of confidence requires painstaking work to rebuild social belonging and self-worth. In the soliloquy, Hamlet despairs such efforts may only lead to ‘grunt and sweat under a weary life‘. However, later in Act 4, after observing the Norwegian prince Fortinbras risking thousands of lives for a trivial piece of land, Hamlet berates himself, saying, ‘How all occasions do inform against me/And spur my dull revenge!‘ This marks a turning point where he recognises the need to overcome his ‘pale cast of thought‘ and reclaim purpose through courageous action, consistent with Adler’s model.

Horney’s concept of the conflicting impulses between one’s inward real self and outward idealised self also powerfully resonates with Hamlet’s tormented pathway. Throughout the play, he displays anxious ambivalence, caught between a tendency for spiralling rumination and anguished indignation, epitomising his real self for all to see in direct confrontation, tension or ‘the rub’ with an imagined ideal of upholding his slain father’s legacy by decisively avenging his murder, as his idealised self might act. This tension crescendos in Act 3, Scene 4, after Hamlet spares Claudius at prayer, justifying his inaction by saying Claudius would go to heaven rather than hell. Hamlet castigates himself, ‘O, from this time forth, / My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!‘ Here, his idealised identity gains temporary dominance, spurring a newfound courage to vanquish his real self’s inhibitions and pursue violent retribution. However, this resolve soon evaporates, exemplifying the precarious balance between his real and idealised selves. Only in the final act does Hamlet reconcile this schism, achieving heroism in death by fatally stabbing Claudius before naming Fortinbras as his successor.

Phillips’ insights into the fluid complexities of human emotions offer a subtle lens on Hamlet’s tortuous path towards precarious authenticity. Phillips rejects simplistic binary oppositions, instead viewing courage and confidence as emerging from an ambiguous dialectical dance between contradictory feelings and impulses. This perspective highlights the crucial importance of Hamlet’s long-awaited killing of Claudius in Act 5, Scene 2. Despite its apparent simplicity, this action is fraught with hesitation until the very brink of action is sealed. Hamlet’s bold declaration that ‘The readiness is all‘ underscores his remarkable inability to sustain the courage or confidence to act, despite contending with a complex personal equation of insecurity, ambivalence, avoidance, and catastrophic thinking. It took wrestling with his conscience’s paradoxes to find spontaneous, if not lasting, courage. Thus, Phillips may interpret Hamlet’s courage not as a sudden outbreak of heroism but instead as an eruption from a gruelling engagement with life’s contradictions and uncertainties.

Shakespeare’s portrayal of Hamlet as an insecure and sometimes neurotic character who is motivated to take action by Fortinbras’ bold example, is in line with the psychoanalytic perspective of confidence. This perspective views confidence as a way to conquer shame and insecurity. Furthermore, it sees courage as a commitment to taking action despite the presence of guilt or doubt. Hamlet is still a paragon of human insecurity, suspended between paralysing thought and liberating deed, a mind ransacked and fragmented by self-belief fleetingly won or lost directed from an obscured unconscious realm. The enduring allure of Hamlet’s personal travails—his waning confidence over courage and his emotionality overpowering his rationality—have captured the hearts and minds of audiences for generations. However, to truly appreciate the relationship between confidence and courage in the broadest sense, one might question whether, in recent years, confidence has taken a more prominent position, overshadowing the importance of courage. I want to argue that courage and confidence, though often conflated, arise from divergent psychological substrates. To elucidate the crucial differences and possible reprioritisations of confidence and courage, we now turn to foundational psychoanalytic frameworks that supply theoretical scaffolding for analysis. 

Elucidating Conceptual Divergences: A Critical Framework

In the gardens of literature, it is rare to meet an oeuvre as expansive and insightful into the human condition as that of William Shakespeare. The Bard’s canon serves as a veritable lexicon for the complexities of the human psyche, replete with nuanced terms that are often—though erroneously—used in a manner that suggests interchangeability. Notable among these are the constructs of confidence and courage, the conceptual boundaries of which call for rigorous academic scrutiny. To ensure that we do not commit the mistake of attributing modern thoughts and perspectives to a historical character—fictional or otherwise—we must shift our attention from Hamlet and focus instead on contemporary experiences that are more relatable and relevant to our current context. By doing so, I may avoid any anachronistic interpretations and gain a deeper understanding of the themes and meanings of those themes that may be still applicable today.

Prima facie, the term confidence refers to an assured belief in one’s capabilities, a belief often underpinned by a history of successful undertakings and favourable outcomes. It is a psychological state that extrapolates from a repertoire of prior triumphs to proffer a foundation of self-assurance, thereby equipping the individual to navigate future endeavours with a heightened sense of competence. Contrasting this, courage implicates the wilfulness and fortitude requisite for confronting uncertainty, danger, or anguish while refraining from yielding to paralysing fears. Uniquely future-oriented, courage is inherently predicated upon the provisional suspension of particular desired or idealised outcomes.

To further probe these constructs, one might beneficially enlist the lens of psychoanalytic thought, a discipline replete with scholarly nuance that facilitates unravelling human psychological complexities. In deviating from the Freudian orthodoxy, Adler afforded considerable attention to the psychosocial elements pivotal to human experience—namely, social belonging and the transcending of inferiority complexes. In the Adlerian conceptual framework, confidence may be regarded as the psychological dividend of secure social integration coupled with diminished feelings of inferiority. Adler’s perspective on confidence is that it is not an innate trait, but rather something earned through demonstrating one’s competence in a particular area. This process of accruing confidence can be seen as a form of social currency, with each successful demonstration of one’s abilities increasing their perceived value among their peers. By mitigating feelings of inadequacy through this process, individuals are able to build their confidence and become more resilient in the face of challenges. However, it is worth noting that Adler’s perspectives might be critiqued for overemphasising the social determinants of psychological well-being, thereby attenuating complex emotional states to mere by-products of social conditions. Within the confines of the present paper, Adler’s framework serves as a foundational paradigm that imbues the conceptualisation of confidence with additional layers of social and emotional context. This addition enriches the conception of confidence, thereby providing a more nuanced and sophisticated perspective on this construct.

Phillips might inject a further layer of complexity into this debate. Using his style of analysis, Phillips might delve into the intricate and multifaceted nature of confidence as a psychological construct. He sheds light on a range of factors that contribute to the formation and maintenance of confidence, including but not limited to personal beliefs, past experiences, and social influences. Phillips might further highlight the complex interplay between confidence and doubt or shame, noting that while confidence is often thought of as desirable, it is often undermined by underlying doubts and insecurities. He would likely argue that these doubts, which are often suppressed and unconscious, can erode even the most steadfast sense of confidence and constantly threaten its stability. Phillips may also note the role of external validation in forming confidence, pointing out that humans are inherently social creatures who seek approval and recognition from others. However, he warns that relying too heavily on external validation can lead to a fragile sense of confidence that is easily shaken by criticism or rejection. Phillips’ analysis underscores the importance of understanding confidence’s nuanced and dynamic nature as a psychological construct and calls for a more nuanced approach to cultivating and maintaining this elusive state of mind. Moreover, Phillips nuances the concept of courage through his analytical expositions on the plural nature of human desires and frustrations, advocating that courage is more than a manifestation of heroic determination; rather, it is an intricate psychic equilibrium that balances conscious wishes with unconscious fears. That said, Phillips’ contributions may be critiqued for their complexity, which could be perceived as obfuscating rather than clarifying the constructs under consideration. In response, Phillips’ approach infuses the psychoanalytic discourse with a requisite level of ambiguity that reflects the inherent complexities of the human psyche, thereby enriching the analysis of human functioning.

Adding a feminist psychoanalytic lens, Horney’s incisive critiques of traditional Freudian theories offer yet another layer of conceptual sophistication. Horney’s analysis reveals that confidence is a complex concept heavily influenced by relational validation or sociocultural factors. She argues that societal norms and gender roles significantly shape our understanding of what it means to be confident. In her model, Horney highlights an internal struggle between the real self and the idealised self constructed by society. The real self represents an individual’s true nature, while the idealised self is an aspirational version of oneself that is shaped by societal expectations. This internal conflict often results in a distorted sense of confidence. Individuals may adopt a false sense of confidence to conform to societal expectations, leading to an overinflated sense of self-worth. Alternatively, they may experience crippling self-doubt when they feel that they do not meet society’s expectations of what it means to be confident. Thus, Horney’s model sheds light on the complex sociocultural factors that contribute to our understanding of ‘confidence.’ It highlights the importance of recognising the nuanced nature of this concept and the need to move beyond simplistic, one-dimensional understandings of what it means to be confident. Although some critics might argue that Horney’s feminist approach to studying psychological constructs is too specific and could potentially limit broader interpretations, it is important to note the invaluable contribution that Horney’s work offers in terms of analysing the gendered dimensions of these constructs. By examining the impact of societal norms or gender, Horney’s work offers valuable insights into the ways individuals navigate their environments and form their identities. Her research contributes significantly to our understanding of how societal norms shape our psychological experiences or constructs. Through her research, Horney provides a nuanced understanding of how societal norms may shape the denotation or connotations freighted by confidence or courage.

The different paradigms of Adler, Phillips, and Horney serve as a composite, psychoanalytic framework that serves to enrich our concern with differentiating confidence and courage. The tryptic psychoanalytic framework presents a valuable theoretical structure for comprehending the multifaceted relationship between confidence and courage. This framework also significantly augments the depth of psychoanalytic analyses that can be applied to both historical and contemporary figures and narratives. Confidence and courage are not unambiguous, immutable concepts but rather are dynamic attributes shaped by internal drives and external influences. Consequently, confidence and courage should be viewed as socially and psychologically embedded attributes shaped by a complex interplay of internal and external factors. The triangulation of the thoughts outlined herein presents an invaluable resource for navigating the psychological complexities inherent in constructs. To fully comprehend the nature of confidence and courage, it is essential to explore their aspects as encompassing both personal and social domains. Confidence refers to trust or assurance in one’s abilities, qualities, and judgments. It is a trait that develops over time, and its level can vary depending on competence and context. On the other hand, courage is a univocal conscious ability to confront fear, pain, or danger and act in the face of adversity. It is an aspect that requires bravery and determination. Confidence and courage are not interchangeable concepts; they have different dimensions that operate at different levels of consciousness. Confidence and courage are two sides of the same coin, both essential in our personal and professional lives. While psychic and inter-psychic factors can influence confidence, courage is a decision we make, a leap to a conscious act precisely and despite feeling fear or uncertainty. By understanding these subtle differences, we can gain a deeper appreciation of our own capabilities, limitations, and how they shape our interactions with the world around us. With this knowledge, we can cultivate the confidence and courage we need to pursue our goals and dreams and make a positive impact on ourselves and those around us. Here is a selection of examples of how one might view this fascinating coin.

Psychoanalytic Perspectives in Application: Cross-Cultural and Cross-Temporal Case Studies

With the conceptual scaffolding established, we now move to application through a series of analytical case studies spanning cultural and historical contexts. By looking at these concepts in a cross-temporal way, we can draw rich associations that speak to their enduring relevance within, or potential limitations outside, the psychoanalytic frames that have been proposed by Adler, Phillips, and Horney.

1.     Athena: The Goddess of Invincible Confidence

In the annals of ancient Greek mythology, Athena stands as an exemplar of multifarious virtues, encompassing not merely wisdom but also courage, military acumen, and leadership. Her divine patronage was deemed pivotal in the flourishing of the Athenian Golden Age, a belief immortalised in monumental works of art such as the Parthenon. This temple, an architectural marvel dedicated to Athena, serves as an enduring testament to her indelible impact on Athenian culture. Yet, Athena’s influence transcended the boundaries of Athens, permeating the broader Greek world. Her cultural representation aligns closely with Adler’s psychological theories, which posit that confidence emanates from a robust sense of social belonging or overcoming feelings of inferiority. As a revered figure in the Greco-Roman pantheon, Athena—or Minerva, as she was known in Rome—provided her devotees with an archetypal model of capability and equanimity, even in the most tumultuous circumstances.

However, a nuanced psychoanalytic interpretation, particularly through a lens like Phillips’, suggests that Athena’s ostensibly impregnable confidence may be a façade concealing intricate psychological underpinnings. The deities of Greek mythology are often construed as amplified reflections of human traits and impulses. Consequently, Athena’s divine courage and unassailable self-assurance are not entirely exempt from the vicissitudes, doubts, and latent anxieties that are integral to the human psyche. This perspective raises the provocative notion that Athena’s unwavering confidence might be a meticulously constructed performance designed to inspire her followers while simultaneously granting them the space to grapple with their own human frailties. It is at this juncture that we should consider the potential pitfalls of such unyielding confidence, both for Athena and her Athenian devotees. While classical literature depicts Athena as an inscrutable and invincible goddess, it is highly unlikely that her mortal followers could emulate such a divine persona in their quotidian lives. Athena’s unflinching display of strength and invincibility could well be interpreted as a compensatory mechanism for the vulnerabilities and insecurities that her citizenry might have harboured. This is not mere conjecture but a hypothesis steeped in significance. Athena was venerated as the guardian of the polis and its citizenry, embodying the Athenian ideals of wisdom, courage, and justice. When one extrapolates Athena’s character onto the Athenian state and its populace, the implications are profound and deliberate. The Athenians, both ancient and modern, are a people imbued with a robust sense of pride and conviction. However, this very self-assurance can metamorphose into rigidity and even hubris, echoing the overconfidence of figures like Meletus in the trial of Socrates. Thus, the Athenians’ unyielding faith in their own capabilities could be seen as a double-edged sword, mirroring the potential vulnerabilities concealed behind Athena’s invincible exterior. While Athena’s indomitable confidence serves as an aspirational archetype, it also poses a cautionary tale about the perils of overconfidence for her Athenian followers. This duality is not merely coincidental but laden with intentional and enduring significance, offering a rich insight that continues to resonate in the psychoanalytic and cultural discourses of today. Those who stay sceptical would do well to heed the closing arguments in the trial of Socrates, a seminal moment that encapsulates the complexities of Athenian self-perception and its potential for both greatness and downfall.^[3]

2.     Joan of Arc: A Feminist Archetype of Resolute Courage

In medieval history, Joan of Arc stands as an indomitable figure, emblematic of courage and resolve in the face of overwhelming adversity. Her story, however, gains additional layers of complexity and nuance when examined through the psychoanalytic framework proposed by Horney. Horney’s thesis offers a compelling lens through which to scrutinise Joan’s actions and motivations. Born into the humble circumstances of a peasant family, Joan was confronted with the formidable challenge of an occupying enemy force during the Hundred Years’ War. Yet, she envisioned herself as nothing less than the divinely ordained liberator of France. This idealised self-image was not merely a fanciful aspiration but a compelling psychological imperative, driving her to defy not only the enemy but also the deeply entrenched patriarchal norms of her time. Joan’s trial and subsequent execution for heresy and witchcraft serve as pivotal moments that crystallise her audacious defiance against the gender roles and societal expectations imposed upon women in medieval Europe. Her refusal to capitulate to these norms was not merely an act of rebellion but a profound manifestation of her courage, aligned with Horney’s notion of the ‘courage to become’ one’s idealised self. This courage was not an abstract concept but a lived reality, necessitating a constant negotiation between her real self—fraught with vulnerabilities and limitations—and her idealised self, imbued with divine purpose and heroic potential. In this context, Joan’s courage may be interpreted as a compromise formation, a psychological mechanism that enabled her to navigate the chasm between her real and idealised selves, situated within the specific socio-political milieu of her time.

Transitioning to contemporary perspectives, the work of Brené Brown offers a complementary understanding of courage that dovetails remarkably well with both Horney’s psychoanalytic framework and Adam Phillips’ relational psychoanalytic theories.^[4] Brown’s empirical research underscores the role of vulnerability as an essential component of courage. Unlike the mythological Athena—who exudes an unassailable confidence—Brown’s conception of courage is rooted in the willingness to engage with the uncomfortable emotional truths that constitute our human experience. This involves a conscious embrace of vulnerability and uncertainty, elements that are often shunned in conventional narratives about strength and heroism but are intrinsic to the human condition. Brown’s insights resonate with Phillips’ psychoanalytic emphasis on the role of uncertainty in the human psyche, suggesting that courage is not a static attribute but a dynamic interplay between conscious aspirations and unconscious fears. In this intricate dance, courage emerges as a dialectical process, a negotiation between the known and the unknown, the self and the other, the real and the ideal. This complex interplay is not merely theoretical but finds its vivid expression in the life and legacy of Joan. Her courage, far from being an unambiguous virtue, was a nuanced psychological construct, shaped by her unique historical context and her internal emotional landscape. The courage exhibited by Joan may be substantively understood as a compromise formation between her real and idealised selves, a concept deeply rooted in Horney’s thesis. This understanding is further enriched by Brené Brown’s contemporary research, which posits vulnerability and uncertainty as integral dimensions of courage. Together, these frameworks offer a multifaceted understanding of courage that transcends simplistic narratives and delves into the complex psychological and socio-cultural factors that shape human behaviour. Joan’s legacy, therefore, serves not merely as a historical artefact but as a compelling case study that continues to inform and inspire our understanding of courage, vulnerability, and the human psyche. 

3.     The Transformative Power of Social Interest: Tuesdays with Morrie as an Adlerian Exemplar

Mitch Albom’s seminal memoir, Tuesdays with Morrie (1997), serves as an illuminating exemplar when examined through the Adlerian psychoanalytic framework, particularly Alfred Adler’s concept of Gemeinschaftsgefühl, commonly translated as ‘social interest’ or ‘community feeling.’^[5] This concept is central to Adler’s psychological theory, which diverges markedly from Freudian psychoanalysis by placing greater emphasis on socio-cultural determinants of psychological well-being rather than innate sexual and aggressive drives. Adler posits that social interest is a crucial metric for evaluating an individual’s psychological health, defined by one’s capacity for empathy and cooperative engagement with the broader community. In Tuesdays with Morrie, Albom chronicles his weekly dialogues with his ailing former professor, Morrie Schwartz, who is grappling with the terminal stages of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). These conversations, which touch upon existential themes such as love, work, ageing, and mortality, serve as a conduit for the cultivation of social interest. Morrie’s role as a mentor is pivotal; he provides Albom with invaluable insights that enable him to confront his own existential anxieties and uncertainties. This mentor-mentee relationship is a quintessential manifestation of Adler’s concept of social interest, facilitating a shared human experience that engenders a sense of belonging and, consequently, self-assurance or confidence.² The memoir further elucidates the transformative power of deeply engaged mentoring relationships in fostering self-growth and, more pertinently, lasting confidence. This is particularly significant when one considers Adler’s notion of ‘life tasks,’ which encompass social tasks that involve the formation of friendships and intimate relationships. Albom’s transformative path, catalysed by his interactions with Morrie, may be interpreted as fundamentally Adlerian. It aligns closely with Adler’s emphasis on mastering life tasks as a pathway to achieving lasting confidence, a psychological state distinct from the more transient and situational construct of courage.^[6]

The distinction made here between confidence and courage is noteworthy. While courage often involves confronting and overcoming immediate challenges and fears, often in the face of uncertainty and vulnerability, confidence is situated as a more enduring psychological state. It is, however, ‘enduring’ insofar as it is founded on accumulated experiences and interpersonal relationships that affirm one’s sense of self and place within a community. In this regard, Tuesdays with Morrie serves as a compelling narrative testament to Adler’s psychoanalytic principles, illustrating how social interest and meaningful interpersonal relationships are integral to the development of lasting confidence. Mitch Albom’s memoir stands as an exemplary narrative embodiment of Adlerian psychoanalytic principles underscoring the indispensable role of social interest and meaningful interpersonal relationships in fostering lasting confidence, a psychological state that is distinct yet complementary to courage. This memoir not only validates Adler’s theoretical constructs but also enriches our understanding of the complex interplay between confidence and courage, offering a nuanced perspective that transcends disciplinary boundaries and historical contexts. The enduring relevance of Adler’s psychoanalytic framework—as evidenced by its applicability to Albom’s contemporary narrative—attests to its perennial insight and versatility, thereby substantiating its significance in the ongoing discourse on relational psychological well-being and sine qua non for human flourishing.

This curated anthology of case studies, ranging from the first to the third, offers a panoramic view of the intricate relationship between confidence and courage, traversing a diverse array of topics. These include the binary conceptualisations of confidence, the courage inherent in embracing vulnerability, and the enduring confidence that emanates from what Adler would term ‘social interest’ and what contemporary psychoanalysis might describe as ‘relational belonging.’ Each case study serves as a prism, refracting complex psychological constructs into comprehensible insights that span multiple disciplines and historical epochs. The figures under scrutiny—Athena, Joan of Arc, and Brené Brown—though separated by vast temporal and cultural chasms, reveal intriguing resonances in their embodiment of psychoanalytic facets that connect confidence and courage. For some, these resonances may be archetypal, rooted in the collective unconscious; for others, they may be culturally specific, shaped by the unique socio-historical contexts from which these figures emerged. The juxtaposition of these historical and mythological figures with Mitch Albom’s more contemporary narrative perspective serves to illuminate the enduring complexity and adaptability of the constructs of confidence and courage. By examining these figures and narratives through the analytical frameworks of Adler, Phillips, and Horney, we achieve a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of confidence and courage. These psychoanalytic lenses not only provide a balanced view but also underscore the adaptive flexibility of psychoanalytic theories across varying cultural and historical landscapes. Such adroit integrations lend credence to the argument for the perennial relevance and versatility of the psychoanalytic theories foregrounded in this discourse.

However, the question that looms large is how to reconcile the apparent differences and contradictions that emerge from this comparative analysis. One possible avenue for reconciliation lies in acknowledging the complexity and fluidity of psychological constructs. Confidence and courage are not static entities but dynamic interplays of various psychological, social, and cultural factors. Recognising this dynamism allows for a more integrated understanding that accommodates the divergences and convergences observed across different case studies. Another approach might involve embracing the polysemy of these constructs, acknowledging that they can carry different meanings and implications in different contexts, thereby enriching rather than diluting their conceptual depth. This collection of case studies serves as a fertile ground for the exploration of the complex relationship between confidence and courage. It not only broadens our conceptual horizons but also attests to the enduring applicability and adaptability of psychoanalytic theories across diverse cultural and historical contexts. The challenge, then, is not merely to catalogue these insights but to synthesise them into a coherent framework that can navigate the complexities and contradictions inherent in these ever-evolving psychological constructs. But one might ask, how are we to specifically reconcile these differences?

Addressing Critiques: Refining and Strengthening the Central Thesis

The application of psychoanalytic perspectives to elucidate or tease out the conceptual differences between confidence and courage is susceptible to thoughtful criticism, which may be welcomed with good faith and scholarly engagement. This section addresses critiques of the thesis that confidence often overshadows courage. These basic assumptions are general and ought to be addressed at the outset, namely: lack of falsifiability, determinist or overly reductive reliance, and cultural bias. One of the most enduring criticisms of psychoanalytic theory is its perceived unscientific nature. Critics argue that it lacks empirical verifiability and relies on subjective interpretations, thus failing to meet the criteria for scientific rigour. Take the Oedipus complex, a seminal idea in Freudian psychoanalysis. Its evidence largely stems from case studies and clinical observations rather than controlled experiments, making it susceptible to the confirmation bias of the analyst. The claim that psychoanalysis is unscientific often originates from a positivist understanding of science, which prioritises empirical, quantifiable evidence. However, this perspective overlooks the complexities of human subjectivity, which are only sometimes amenable to quantitative measurement. Psychoanalysis, instead, adopts a hermeneutic approach, interpreting the latent meanings and unconscious motivations that shape human behaviour. This opens up a nuanced, rich vein of understanding that is difficult to capture through empirical methods alone. Core psychoanalytic concepts like the unconscious have found validation in various ways. For instance, empirical studies in psychology have demonstrated the existence of unconscious processes affecting decision-making and bias. Moreover, the field of psychodynamic psychotherapy, which borrows heavily from psychoanalysis, has numerous evidence-based treatments that have been empirically validated. In adjacent fields, Terror Management Theory which explores how the fear of death influences behaviour, resonates with Freud’s ideas about the death drive and has been empirically tested through various experiments (see below).

Psychoanalysis stands accused of reducing the complexity of human experience to a set of primitive drives or archetypal conflicts. Freud’s notion that sexual and aggressive drives underpin much of human behaviour can seem reductionist when applied to complex socio-cultural phenomena like religion or art. While psychoanalysis may simplify complex realities like these to sublimation, this ‘simplification’ is often necessary to form theoretical constructs for conceptual analysis. Such reductive elements may serve as building blocks to identify meaningful psychological patterns. For example, the accusation of reductionism in psychoanalysis often misses the point of theoretical abstraction. While it is true that psychoanalytic theories distil complex phenomena into basic drives or archetypal conflicts, these reductions serve as heuristic tools. They allow for the identification of foundational psychological components, which can then be reassembled to understand more complex emotional and behavioural patterns. In this sense, psychoanalysis offers a form of ‘sophisticated reductionism,’ where simplified elements are not endpoints but starting blocks for intricate exploration. Freud’s structural model of the mind—id, ego, and superego—supplies a simplified but useful framework for understanding the complexities of human thought and action. This model has found its applications in understanding moral dilemmas, ethical decision-making, and even in organisational behaviour studies. The reductions thus serve as a lens through which to view and study complex phenomena (see ethical intuitionism).^[7]

Critics argue that psychoanalytic theories are Eurocentric and may not be universally applicable, especially in non-Western cultures. The Oedipal complex concept is heavily rooted in Western, particularly Judeo-Christian, familial and societal structures. In matrilineal or communal societies, the dynamics of parent-child relationships can be significantly different. While early psychoanalytic theories were rooted in a specific Western context, the core tenets of psychoanalysis exhibit a remarkable degree of cross-cultural transferability when applied judiciously. The flexibility of psychoanalytic frameworks allows them to be adapted to diverse cultural settings, thereby mapping the deep topography of the human psyche across various landscapes. For instance, the concept of the Oedipal complex can be reformulated to consider the distinct familial dynamics in matrilineal societies or those with communal parenting. Indian psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar (2003) has effectively integrated Indian cultural concepts with psychoanalytic theories, demonstrating their cross-cultural applicability (see below).

With respect to the present paper, a first criticism holds that those psychoanalytic theories risk oversimplifying exceedingly complex human phenomena like confidence and courage by reducing them to neatly defined attributes akin to the general basic assumption (see above). From this view, the underside of the carpet of human emotion will inherently resist tidy categorisation, especially across divergent historical and cultural settings. This caution against excessive reductivism arises from a legitimate concern. Psychoanalysis should not claim to offer definitive or all-encompassing schematisations of profound capacities like confidence and courage. The inner workings of the human psyche might always resist comprehensive codification. However, abstraction through scaffolding is necessary for meaningful conceptual or linguistic analysis of the underlying drivers and dynamics. Theoretical frameworks provide interpretive or conceptual structures to identify common patterns amid individual variations in how confidence and courage manifest. Consider the case of Joan of Arc, made legend as the courageous liberator of medieval France. A purely descriptive historical account of her achievements overlooks the deeper psychological currents energising her heroism and her milieu. By contrast, Horney’s psychoanalytic categories of the real self versus the idealised self offer analytical traction to appreciate Joan’s courage as fuelled by the unwavering pursuit of authentic being and unyielding faith, defiant of prevailing social proscriptions against any woman in any leadership role. Horney’s theoretical lens lends coherence without collapsing the irreducible complexity and ambiguity of Joan’s internal and external realities. Psychoanalytic insights into confidence and courage also gain substantiation from lived experience. For instance, Horney’s conception of overcompensatory confidence, adopted as a mask for suppressed doubts or insecurities (see above), resonates with commonly observed behaviours of individuals who exhibit exaggerated self-assurance to compensate for internal feelings of inadequacy. Likewise, Adler’s contention that social belonging is pivotal for genuine confidence-building shows an inverse correlation with empirical research showing that experiences of social rejection or exclusion decrease self-esteem and perceived self-efficacy.^[8] While reductive oversimplifications are unreasonable or plainly silly, judicious theoretical abstraction holds genuine hermeneutic value—the power to bring the obscured drivers and dynamics underlying surface manifestations of confidence and courage into sharper focus is generative on the grounds of conceptual analysis.

A second line of critique argues that psychoanalytic theories developed primarily from Western intellectual traditions may lack validity or adaptability for analysing non-Western cultural exemplars of confidence and courage. Can frameworks rooted in the specific thought systems of early twentieth-century Europe fruitfully interpret contemporary figures from decidedly diverse cultures? This objection regarding cultural particularity is well-founded; situational specificity matters greatly in applying psychoanalytic ideas. The examples of Athena and Joan of Arc are inextricably linked to ancient Greece and medieval France. However, with careful contextual adaptation, the universal insights of psychoanalysis may prove enlightening across cultural boundaries. Consider Cut Nyak Dien, an early twentieth-century Indonesian guerrilla fighter who resisted Dutch colonisation. With parallels to Joan of Arc’s example, Cut Nyak Dien’s courage may be examined through Horney’s lens as manifesting an idealised vision of herself as a liberation fighter challenging prevailing gender codes. Alternatively, take the nineteenth-century Xhosa chief Makhanda, who led warriors against British imperialism in South Africa. Adler’s concept of social belonging sheds light on Makhanda’s sense of duty to protect his community as a driver of his courageous resistance. While psychoanalytic theories carry the inevitable imprint of their genesis, their conceptual vocabulary holds meaningful cross-cultural applicability when applied sensitively. The point, however, is how the judicious adaptation of these ideas to diverse settings takes shape. As Sudhir Kakar (2003) notes, with due modification, psychoanalysis may ‘provide a grammar of meanings with which different cultures can articulate their distinctive psychological and emotional realities.’^[9]

A third objection contends that psychoanalytic theories lack adequate empirical substantiation, arguing that scientific validation is necessary to verify claims about non-conscious drivers of confidence and courage. Does psychoanalysis make falsifiable predictions amenable to hypothesis testing? This empiricist critique merits a nuanced response similar to that given to general basic assumptions (see above). Psychoanalysis diverges from mainstream psychology in dealing with largely unconscious mental phenomena that are only sometimes amenable to controlled measurement. However, extensive clinical evidence affirms the explanatory potency of its conceptual frameworks. Therapists worldwide apply psychoanalytic principles daily, observing their illuminating value for understanding patients’ behaviours, emotions, and motivations. Moreover, adjacent fields of empirical study lend convergent support to essential psychoanalytic propositions. For instance, research on terror management theory, which integrates psychoanalytic concepts like unconscious defence mechanisms against fear and anxiety, has found that increased self-esteem and confidence buffer against unconscious death anxiety.^[10] Neuroimaging studies also demonstrate that psychodynamic therapy grounded in psychoanalysis leads to measurable changes in brain activity and functional connectivity patterns.^[11] Thus, while not readily falsifiable, psychoanalytic insights gain significant experiential and empirical validation clinically and through adjacent disciplines. Notwithstanding, the intrinsic utility of psychoanalytic theories resides primarily in its provision of supple interpretive frameworks to intelligibly or reasonably map the hidden psychological forces shaping overt manifestations of conscious and unconscious phenomena like confidence and conscious phenomena like courage. Reflective engagement with potential criticisms strengthens, not undermines, the judicious application of psychoanalytic perspectives to shed light on the concepts of confidence and courage. My aim here is not to advance psychoanalysis as the final word but rather to open a rigorous line of cultural and historical inquiry informed by analytical insights and adaptable theoretical concepts for mapping the complex topography of the human psyche and its constructs. Contention inspires refinement, not rejection, of the central thesis under debate. And when utilised critically yet sensitively, psychoanalysis remains a valuable tool for tracing the subtle contouring of confidence and courage in their individual and sociocultural, conscious and unconscious manifestations.

In Conclusion: Implications for Theory and Practice

The analysis presented in this paper supplies quite interesting evidence supporting the thesis that courage and confidence, while often used interchangeably, have distinct psychological foundations. According to relational psychoanalysis, confidence is rooted in positive validation from relationships with others, creating a construct that seeks affirmation from the external world and may result in an unstable yet necessary dependency on validation as such. Conversely, courage is intimately connected to overcoming internal uncertainties and facing uncomfortable or vulnerable aspects of oneself despite that these artefacts are not consciously known. The task for courage is thus to avoid binary formulations and instead transcend individualistic desires within a supervening conscious awareness of the developmental necessity of individuation, where the value of others and the cultivation of an internal relationship with one’s inner complexities and doubts become one. 

One concrete implication for society lies in the realm of education. Current educational models often focus on building confidence through achievement, which unintentionally makes the learning experience externally driven. Adopting a psychoanalytic understanding would suggest the need for educational frameworks that instil the courage to confront vulnerability, ambiguity or uncertainty. This might be implemented through pedagogical approaches that encourage critical thinking, ethical dilemmas, or exposure to the uncomfortable unknown, thereby fostering resilience or an internal locus of control. Another example exists in the shape of leadership models that often extol the virtues of confidence but rarely touch upon the necessity of courage. A psychoanalytic perspective suggests that effective leaders are not just those who can assert themselves with confidence but those who can navigate the murky waters of uncertainty and ethical complexity. Leadership training programmes could benefit from incorporating scenarios that require individuals to confront internal and external uncertainties, thereby developing courage over mere confidence. In the context of mental health, appreciating the interplay between courage and confidence could offer a more targeted approach to therapeutic interventions. For instance, individuals suffering from anxiety disorders may benefit from treatments that focus on building a courage base to confront immediate fears, while those with self-esteem issues may require interventions aimed at fostering a long-term confidence base. The paper’s emphasis on psychological precision in differentiating between these attributes could guide clinicians in tailoring more effective treatment plans, thereby enhancing the efficacy of mental health services. From a public policy perspective, the paper’s findings could inform initiatives aimed at community building and social welfare. Policies that foster social interest and community feeling, as Adler would put it, could serve to build both courage and confidence within communities, particularly those that are marginalised or disadvantaged. For example, community outreach programs that encourage civic engagement could build a courage base by challenging individuals to face societal issues, while educational programs could foster a confidence base by providing individuals with the skills and knowledge they need to succeed. Thus, the paper’s conceptual framework could serve as a blueprint for public policy initiatives aimed at enhancing the psychological well-being of communities. Moreover, in the realm of healthcare policy, understanding the distinct psychological contexts for cultivating courage and confidence could inform patient care models. For instance, patients dealing with acute health crises may need immediate interventions that focus on safely building courage, while those dealing with chronic conditions may benefit from long-term strategies aimed at safely building confidence in managing their health.

This paper posits that a re-evaluation of the virtue of courage in relation to the attribute of confidence is both timely and necessary. The argument is substantiated through the psychoanalytic frameworks of Adler, Phillips, and Horney. By triangulating the ideas of these eminent clinicians, the paper elucidates the nuanced interdependence between courage and confidence while also highlighting the distinct psychological contexts in which each can be cultivated.

One of the paper’s novel contributions is its emphasis on the need for psychological precision in differentiating between courage and confidence. This ‘differentiation’ is not merely semantic but has significant practical implications for both personal and professional development. Courage, often understood as the ability to confront fear, uncertainty, or intimidation, is a virtue that can be developed in situations that demand immediate action despite risks. Confidence, on the other hand, is a longer-term attribute built upon a foundation of accumulated experiences and skills that affirm one’s sense of self and abilities. Understanding these distinctions allows for a more targeted approach to cultivating each attribute, depending on the psychological context and the specific challenges at hand. The paper also acknowledges the limitations inherent in psychoanalytic theories, particularly their historical and cultural specificity. However, it argues that the core insights of psychoanalysis remain adaptable and relevant in contemporary settings. This adaptability is evidenced by the paper’s application of these psychoanalytic frameworks to a diverse range of case studies, thereby demonstrating their enduring applicability across different cultural and historical contexts.

To illustrate the paper’s argument, consider Hamlet’s admiration for his friend Horatio’s equanimity, as expressed in Act 3, Scene 2 of Shakespeare’s play. Hamlet’s statement, ‘Give me that man that is not passion’s slave and I will wear him in my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart,’ encapsulates the essence of a person who possesses both courage and confidence. Horatio’s ability to remain composed and level-headed in tumultuous situations is a quality that Hamlet struggles to find within himself. This final literary example serves as an illuminating conclusion to the paper’s central thesis: the need for a nuanced yet precise appreciation and cultivation of both courage and confidence, depending on specific psychological and situational contexts.

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^[1] Please see Freud, S. (1953). The Interpretation of Dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), SE IV. Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1899)

^[2] Please see Adler, A. (1956). The individual psychology of Alfred Adler: A systematic presentation in selections from his writings. H. L. Ansbacher & R. R. Ansbacher (Eds.). Basic Books. Also see Adler, A. (1964). Superiority and social interest: A collection of later writings. H. L. Ansbacher & R. R. Ansbacher (Eds.). W.W. Norton & Company.

^[3] Please see Plato. (2008). Apology. In R. Waterfield (Ed. & Trans.), Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo (pp. 25-50). Oxford University Press. (Original work published c. 399 BCE)

^[4] Please see Brown, B. (2012). Daring Greatly: How the Courage to Be Vulnerable Transforms the Way We Live, Love, Parent, and Lead. Gotham Books.

^[5] Please see Oberst, U. E., & Stewart, A. E. (2003). Adlerian Psychotherapy: An Advanced Approach to Individual Psychology. New York: Brunner-Routledge.

^[6] Please see Adler, A. (1964). Superiority and social interest: A collection of later writings. H. L. Ansbacher & R. R. Ansbacher (Eds.). W.W. Norton & Company.

^[7] Please see https://w4dey.wordpress.com/2023/10/12/beyond-normative-ethics-toward-an-ethical-intuitionism-for-psychoanalysis/

^[8] Please see Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(3), 518-530.

^[9] Please see Kakar, S. (2003). Psychoanalysis and Eastern spiritual healing traditions. In D. M. Black (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and religion in the 21st century: Competitors or collaborators? (pp. 201-215). Routledge.

^[10] Please see Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130(3), 435-468.

^[11] Please see Buchheim, A., Erk, S., George, C., Kächele, H., Kircher, T., Martius, P., … & Walter, H. (2012). Neural correlates of attachment trauma in borderline personality disorder: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 201(3), 189-195.