Authority in transference


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This essay links authority and transference in a couple of ways: first there is the relation between psychoanalytic authorities and the methodological application of transference; second, there is the relation between psychoanalytic discourse and power differentials between therapist and client, and discourse to subject of discourse. For introduction purposes the following concepts will require definition: transference, objects, authority and the scene of transference.

Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) provide a useful definition for transference when they write:

‘… a process of actualisation of unconscious wishes. Transference uses specific objects and operates in the framework of a specific relationship established with these objects. Its context par excellence is the analytic situation. In the transference, infantile prototypes re-emerge and are experienced with a strong sensation of immediacy. As a rule, what psycho-analysts mean by the unqualified use of the term ‘transference’ is transference during treatment.’[1]

Immediately from this definition of transference one might draw the following questions, that Laplanche and Pontalis themselves raise, namely is transference solely specific to analysis? Is transference necessary for transformation? Is there functional value to transference? And, lastly, what is being transferred: behaviours, relationships, objects? And from where, which agencies of the mind? We shall return to these interesting themes soon. However, for an initial definition of an object:

‘Psycho-analysis considers the notion of the object from three main points of view. In correlation with the instinct: the object is the thing in respect of which and through the instinct seeks to attain its aim (satisfaction/pleasure). It may be a person or a part-object, a real object or a phantasy one. In correlation with love (or hate): the relation in question here is that between the whole person, or the agency of the ego, and an object which is itself focused upon in its totality (person, entity, ideal, etc.)’.[2] Here even a partial investigation of the difference between the thing and the object drawn from the Philosophy of Mind cannot be allowed for in this space. Nevertheless, two questions are of significant value concerning the psychodynamic usage of the term object: What are instinctual objects? What are relational objects?

Authority, (Dictionary of Modern Thought, 1999), might be distinguishable from Power and Force thus: ‘Authority is an attribute of social organisation – a family, a corporation, a university, a government – in which command inheres in the recognition of some greater competence lodged either in the person or the office itself … Relations between individuals and groups, if regularised and subject to rules, traditional or legal, tend to be authority relations.’[3] That said, to the thought of the influential Frankfurt School social theorist, Max Weber, there are three kinds of authority which can be distinguished: Rational-legal, Traditional, and charismatic.[4]

Jacobs (The Presenting Past, 1998) provides a general structure for the consideration of the space where the therapist[5] meets with and endeavours to make contact and rapport with the client (dynamic scene of transference) as:

‘The psychodynamic method also involves the importance of working through defences and resistance, as well as the use of transference and counter-transference using ‘techniques’ … The development of a model of how people develop from childhood through adolescence into adult life … [And], models of how the mind works or how the personality might be structured.’ [6]

The scene of the psychodynamic concepts at hand might therefore be observed as including but limited to: an enabling by the therapist, a containing and understanding of a therapeutic relationship with clinically derived techniques, the use of guiding principles and models of development through which the transference and object relations (internal dialectics and external relationships) of the subject may be facilitated by the psychotherapist.

The discovery of transference: An untoward event

Now that the ground of authority in these matters has been illuminated in some small way can Freud’s monumentally important theory of transference be explored adequately from a historical perspective. To this backdrop, transferences would appear to have been present since the beginning of the project of psychoanalysis and exampled in the first psychoanalytic treatment ever attempted with Anna O (Breuer and Freud, 1894-1895).[7] Here, the kernel of the theory of transference makes an appearance after the affect of its manifestation: ‘The concept of transference suggests that the “object” of the patient’s experience (be it analyst, friend, lover, even parent) is at best an amended version of the actual other person involved. People react to and interact with not only an actual other but also an internal other, a psychic representation of a person which in itself has the power to influence both the individual’s affective states and his overt behavioural reactions.’[8] This quote sits well when couched beside an example drawn from the period of transferences’ discovery (Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria,1905e):

‘What are transferences? They are the new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment.’[9]

It is well documented that Anna O had fallen in love with the kindly Dr Josef Breuer, and it is equally reported that Breuer reported upon the discomfort of this ‘untoward event’ to his close colleague Freud.[10] Given these circumstances, Breuer had considered his continued treatment of Anna O unethical and inappropriate. It is this situation which leads Freud to reconsider the ethics and boundaries to consider the erotic attraction as a reflex response arising from internally repressed desires.[11] However, in 1915 Freud thinking on transference becomes more inclusive of opposite forces when he says: ‘this precise situation of transference [as if a solely positive experience] held back the progress of psychoanalysis for ten years.’[12] Moreover, it was other case material and experiences, specifically the case of Dora, that challenged Freud to reassess his initial thinking on transference to also include resistance toward the analyst. Freud (1912) had resolved, in the light of his subsequent study of Anna O’s love [as positive-transference] and Dora’s resistance [as negative-transference] that, some portion of libidinal impulse [drive] had been arrested in its development; removed from consciousness and reality, remaining unable to achieve conscious satisfaction by occupying either the imagination or unconscious.[13] Consciousness fantasy and unconscious phantasy were both involved in contributing toward the projection of the father, mother or brother imago on to the analyst.[14] But in so doing Freud surmises that this raises two special points of interest that remained unexplained, firstly that of why transference expresses itself so intensely in neurotic people undergoing analysis, and secondly, why it represents also the most powerful kind of resistance.[15] With its ‘overtones of the pathological’ Freud (1915) appears to have fully secured in his mind a notional understanding that the exaggerated infantile reactions directed toward the object of Love(Eros) were indeed plural and not just singular; in other words they could be positive and/or negative transferences.[16] Freud’s ‘overtones of the pathological’ are suggestive of a developmentally fixated mode of thinking that may be present or characterise the divisions of the love-transference[17]similar to those Klein was to later extrapolate (‘good object and bad object’). However, Freud was to conclude in the same 1915 paper that his own ‘observations on love in transference’ harnessed the mental impulses of the patient for the patients own benefit within the continued authority of his indispensable psychoanalysis and clinical techniques.[18] Moreover, that authority in transference remains for many central to the cathartic, albeit asymmetrical, operation and enterprise of analysis.

New Directions for Transference

Melanie Klein had been invited to present her individualised reading of Freudian theory to the British Psychoanalytic Society under the auspices of her influential sponsorship by Ernest Jones.[19] And here in London, she was to stay, just as Freud would follow in 1938. Klein had been in long-term analysis with Karl Abraham in Berlin (1921-1925) and Sandor Ferenczi (1914-1919) in her native Budapest.[20] She had, therefore, to rise through the ranks of a burgeoning analytic tradition, in that she was a divorced mother of three, and she was forty-four-year-old ex-patriot Jewess. Nevertheless, against presumably considerable odds to the contrary, she displayed sufficient robustness to succeed in her chosen vocation. A determined Klein had come to possess a pure analytic pedigree, she had been trained by Freud’s own finest generals; his political and intellectual inner circle.[21] On that basis, when Klein took on the task of contributing toward the clinical knowledge base of the infantile Oedipal complex (1919-1932), she was perhaps slowed by not just technical issues but possibly by not wishing to incur the disapproval of her true spiritual mentor – Freud himself. However, she was to rise to the head of an ever-strengthening army of followers with alternative views to the classically held position on infantile development. Headed by Klein they became known as the Kleinians. Greenberg and Mitchell (Object Relation in Psychoanalytic Theory, 1983) consider it to have been upon the suggestion of Ferenczi that Klein had begun applying psychoanalytic principles to the emotional lives of children rather than just adults.[22] The prominent professor Hinshelwood (1991) indicates that there are a few basic differences that marked Klein’s thinking out. Firstly, ‘[F]or reasons set in her personality – she fought continually to establish herself securely, a position which constantly evaded her.’[23] By this statement, Hinshelwood appears to be insinuating that Klein and maybe even her adherents were a little precious when it came to the debating of their theories and others.[24] Secondly, a point of divergence with the other schools of analysis was her play technique with children, which according to Hinshelwood, ‘[a]llowed her a much further reach in her area of discovery than anyone before her.’[25] Arguably, anyone also included Freud’s daughter Anna; also a woman of patent analytic pedigree and zeal, for in 1926 Anna was to give a series of lectures in Vienna, her subject was to be her experiences whilst analysing children. This lecture was to descend into the folklore of analysis as a direct criticism by Anna of Klein’s (1922) ‘play technique’ and suggestively marks the beginning of their infamous years of contention from 1926-1946. The end of that period culminated, eventually, in the ‘controversial discussions’,[26]which in turn led to the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’, (hammered out incidentally by three women), of the British Psychoanalytic Society into its current three group format: Classical(the ego-psychologists), Contemporary (the Klein Group) and Independents(the Middle Group).[27] The third and last point raised by professor Hinshelwood is also of considerable interest, it involves the importance of objects and their relations in Klein’s thinking and the effect this was to have on the international psychoanalytic community.[28] In 1927, Klein had published Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children in which she explained the management of the child’s internal world employing expulsions or externalizations.[29] Klein appears to have believed that internal objects were more concretised than those proposed by Freud and as such the introjected aspects of infantile phantasy could become persecuting internal objects, in that, ‘[t]he child thus has a conception of objects inside her own body pictured […] as her own children.’[30] Klein followed this authoritative, if not polemic, take on introjection and externalisation of the internal object world of infants further in her (1929) work, Personification in the Play of Children, where she discusses the hypothesis of multiple imagos making up an authority of multiple objects as the agency of superego. In this way Klein could conceivably have been preparing her insights into the child’s mind – an internal world populated with objects, dominated by anxiety, comprised of helpful-good and persecutory-bad objects.[31] These objects in Klein’s view were not objects such as those found in the concept of an internalised superego, Hinshelwood writes:

‘Internal objects are not ‘representations’, as they might be in memories or conscious phantasies (daydreams). They are felt to make up the substance of the body and the mind.’[32]

One might summarise her thinking at this stage thus, the sensations of this experience are therefore bodily, and tangible, and available from birth, they belong to an internal reality for emotional objects swayed by the desires of the infant for conjuring a bodily presence necessary to construct a primitive internal world, and, the internal objects conjured appear to be manifestations that form the basis of early ego-development.[33] However, she did not stop there, by 1932, she finalises her association with the oedipal complex and unwittingly appears to lay the foundation stone on the formative project of the then object-relational heterodoxy. By 1935, Klein had incorporated the postulation of introjection of two main objects:

‘[F]rom the beginning the ego introjects objects “good” and “bad” for both of which the mother’s breast is prototype.’[34]

In this now-famous statement, she indicates that introjection is available through the senses from birth. Also, helpful and persecutory objects have been simplified to just “good” and “bad” objects. Moreover, the grammar of the sentence above leads one to the suggestion that this process may be viewed as developmentally continuous from birth into adulthood by the inflexible constraints of this prototyping. Although a separate issue in its own right, Klein’s work of 1932 had led her to reach an intellectual zenith in her discovery of the infantile depressive position (1935), and, followed that, in her coining of the chronologically earlier developmental stage of, the now de facto, so-called paranoid-schizoid position (1946/1952). However, her radical reappraisal of aggression, anxiety and guilt in connection with infantile depression, anxiety and the incorporation and expulsion of particulate or split off objects, repositioned the creation of the superego to around the age of four to six months. The depressive position therefore represented a change in emphasis from the projection of bad objects to the elevation of the rôle for introjection[s] of the good object at an earlier period in the infants life than Freud (1905) had hypothesized in his psycho-sexual developmental model for achieving oedipal resolution and thereby the creation of the classical conception of the superego. The paranoid-schizoid position (1946/1952) therefore, according to Segal (1973), ‘must start with a description of the [Kleinian] ego’[35]as one which is ‘capable of forming a phantasy object relationship’[36]that ‘has, from the start, the capacity to experience anxiety [and] use defence mechanisms.’[37] She goes on to construct the rôle of split objects within the ego [as internal objects] into good and bad as foundational to a more mature future outlook on discriminations of an integrated reality, inhabited by whole objects with good and bad facets in the later depressive position. As such, the paranoid-schizoid position constitutes Klein’s understanding of the earliest infantile ego state as being ‘in constant flux, its integration varying from day to day, or even moment to moment’[38]between good and bad things prototyped by breasts. It is within this polarity born of two instincts, life and death, that the [Kleinian] ego first experiences the fear of a persecutor or persecutory anxiety.[39] Segal (1973) appears to be saying that Kleinian theory emphasises the importance of objects and authority within transferences when she writes:

‘I want to emphasise that the basic psycho-analytical setting, attitude and methodology, is not only unaltered by our theoretical views but rather strengthened by them. For instance, the understanding of how projective identification works makes it more evident why it is essential for the analyst not to step out of rôle.’[40]

Segal does not explicitly use the word authority, or for that matter transference at that stage in her thinking, however, she continues:

‘The analyst interprets more what the patient attributes to him and how s/he internalises him [where] [t]he emphasis on transference is also greater [as] the Kleinian view is that the relation to the external world, and indeed interest in the external world, springs from externalization and symbolisation of unconscious phantasy.’ [41]

She contends here perhaps that since the analyst takes on the stance for all internal figures (imagos), all presenting material contains a dynamic element of transference.[42] An accusation, therefore, exists concerning the authority of these so-called concretised objects under interpretation in transference and perhaps continues to plague Kleinian thinking.

Critique of Transference

In her work, To Speak is Never Neutral (2002), Luce Irigaray seemingly demands of her reader that s/he reject the notion of the suitability of a psychoanalytic discourse and technique that fails to consider the language of the woman, fails to consider the language of the womankind as different to language of mankind, and most importantly perhaps points to psychoanalysis as failing to linguistically substantiate itself at the two levels of linguistic representation, utterance and enunciation:

‘In the utterance, discourse fails as realised structure; in the enunciation, it is always infinite, unfinished. The inadequacy of utterance to enunciation makes all discourse incomplete, unendingly taken up and taken back, unstable in signification.’ [43]

Her analysis of parole linguistics, and their engendered modalities within the analytic scene shows her to be a writer ever alive to wordplay, never transparent or obvious – always elusive and tantalising. She is seductive in her undressing of the structural thinking of Freud and his devotee Lacan and scathing in her critique of the false neutrality of these phallocentric authors. Notwithstanding her elegant tendency to character assassination, she is unambiguous when she marries together her understandings of linguistics, gender studies and structural post-Freudian analysis to unfold an argument against an analytic tradition and meta-narrative which seems to highlight nothing less than linguistic poverty in the cause of maintaining paternal authority and exclusivity with feigned neutrality.[44] Irigaray would appear to be radicalising the setting of a transference analysis. Irigaray also appears idiosemiotic in her interpretation of parole (speech) which utilises objects in the relations that exist in a given transferential setting or scene or analytic encounter. Her manifold critique appears specifically focused toward the lack of currency present in psychodynamic thinking concerning its grammatology, linguistic errors, and the gender of the subject. One might therefore justifiably call her idiosemiotic view a psycholinguistic radicalization of the psychodynamic scene. Due to the complexity of Irigaray’s work, (To Speak is Never Neutral, 2002), two main criticisms will be touched upon. The first point for consideration is whether the authority of analysis subverts the utterances of the subject through the lens of transference? And secondly, does analysis perform its cathartic operation without amputation or sacrifice on the part of the subject of that analysis? To the first question Irigaray proposes four main ways in which the project and tradition of analysis act to subvert the utterance of the subject:

‘The utterance is always understood as a symptom of some particularity in the function, or the dysfunction, of the structuring of discourse.’[45]

This first point asserts her view that the utterances of the subject of analysis – their failed structure when compared to the enunciation; itself always an infinitive – always point to a symptom of dysfunction.

‘The definition of an utterance constituted as an object of analysis implies the possibility of isolating it as a discourse-unit. Psychoanalysis simultaneously insists on both the fragmentation of the text and its insertion into a network, into networks, of utterances, from which it cannot be isolated. Always contested as a unit, the utterance in psychoanalysis is interpreted according to its polyvalence, its ambiguity, its plurality.’[46]

The second point appears to question whether the utterance as a discourse-unit can logically be both simultaneously fragmented from its original context whilst being inserted and made more complex by its insertion into an alien lexicon under inspection.

‘Any analysis of the utterance refers more or less explicitly to a typology. Various types of discourse come to be expressed in psychoanalytic treatment; however, their forms and figures are called into question as forms and figures, uncovered as metaphors on which the speaker is dependent.’[47]

The third point is suggestive that the dependence of the analyst upon metaphor appears to call into question the authority of its original typology as its forms and figures appear to be at best indicative.

‘Analysis of the utterance, its formalisation in models, makes use, either intentionally or unintentionally, of the schemata of communication. And the analyst, even as [s/he] utilises these schemata, must question them as possible phantasmatic correlates of the one defining them.’[48]

This fourth and final point would seem to be questioning the ownership of the utterance, through the idiosemiotic perspective that the parole of the speaker has irreducibility of phantasm peculiar to the speaking subject. Any communication, therefore, ought to rest on the idiosemiological authority of the locutor. Therefore, in conclusion of the first main linguistic area of questioning posed by Irigaray as to whether the authority of analysis subverts the utterance through the lens of transference, there does seem to be some linguistic justification for her intervention into the parole of the subject at the level of both discourse and dialogue. To the second question, whether analysis performs its cathartic operation without amputation or sacrifice on the part of the subject of that analysis, Irigaray reveals her most radical nature. She begins hopefully for the uses of analysis when she writes:

‘The cathartic operation is analytic work’s major difficulty when accomplished without amputation or sacrifice, it is a task on the frontier of the possible.’[49]

However, Irigaray’s pedigree as a radical borne out by the furious reception of her second doctoral work, Speculum: Of the Other Woman(1985), appears to dictate the tenor of her 2002 work on the limits of transference concerning gender issues. Irigaray brings the subject of gender to the fore in consideration of an actuality of male phallocentric authority, thus:

‘Oedipal law forbids the daughter’s return to the mother, except insofar as she does as the mother does in maternity. It cuts her off from her beginnings, from her conception, from her genesis, from her birth, from her childhood […] Split in two by oedipal law, (situated henceforth between two men, the father and the lover?), she is exiled into the male, paternal world. An errant beggar in relation to values she will never be able to appropriate.’[50]

The unavoidable collision of male authority stemming from Freudian analytic theories and running through the structural lineage of Lacanian analytic theories, and, the so-called second wave [post 1968] feminism which openly advocated gender-difference and separatism appears to be central to Irigaray’s almost mendicant positioning of women within the male preserve of analytic symbols and figures. She continues, using the terminology of Lacan’s intersubjective and typographical hierarchy of triadic orders, and, a mélange of philosophical influences:

‘The lack of any imaginary and symbolic ground accorded, or recognised, on the part of woman, means that all of this happens in what could be a death-dealing immediacy, prior to any master-slave dialectic. A chiasmus ensues directly, without a mirror. Left and right are inverted in a face-to-face leaving no place for the image of the other, appropriated and traversed on the way to some traditionally paternal infinity. What are taken as movements of the woman-mother are forgotten there.’[51]

The breathtaking complexity of this translation perhaps mists Irigaray’s concealed sentiments, which would appear to be asking of her reader whether transferences are limited by a number of interrelated issues of gender present in the typographical views of analysis, and the dialectic imposed by the self-image of the master morality as originally envisaged by George Hegel and then Nietzsche in his work Beyond Good and Evil, (1886).[52] Her opening statement is suggestive that she believes women have been relegated to Lacan’s order of the Real, an order of words in flux, where words and worlds are coming-into-being, as perhaps even that which encompasses the ineffable and the impossible.[53] The only consensus on the Real therefore may be proposed that it exists as if in the moment of the present and that this moment precludes any burgeoning of slave mentality rebellion. Which, by definition would require time and space for identification, signification and communication of the slave-to-master crossing by inversion? The chiasmus itself is linguistically defined as a grammatical inversion.[54] For example, the phrase “I love you” under the auspices of a chiasmus would become its direct opposite, namely, “You hate me”. In saying that a chiasmus directly ensues Irigaray may be calling into question the ability of the masculine symbols of analytic readings of transferences to interpret, and therefore mirror the authentic gender difference for women, as other, in the analysis. Almost as if the unwitting analyst, whether male or female themselves, acts out their role on an invariant paternal trajectory blissfully unaware of the woman’s manifest visibility [and feminine lexicon] before them; the only understanding of the feminine the analytic totem of the Mother figure. Breathtaking indeed and yet Irigaray understands that transferences themselves are facilitated, in Winnicottian terms of a transitional space, by the analyst:

‘Analysts must ceaselessly reinterpret their own transference, and not simply their own countertransference, but the ground from which they listen and give space-time, for which they give themselves as space-time where they listen. This space-time they give remains non-perceptible for most, who never return to the analyst or his or her own skin or intimacy: space-time that gives itself, crossing from the inside to the outside, like a body already become flesh, offering itself or proposing itself as space in which the analytic scene is held.’[55]

Irigaray’s highly compacted prose, here at least, offers the prospect of an alternative to the phallocentric and structural messages from the analytic tradition. She appears to be suggesting a rigorous reinterpretation of transferences as not just belonging to a trenchant paradigm, rather an analysis that ought to reassess its inclusivity toward the Other as a woman at both the level of dialogue in the case above, and discourse as in the case below:

‘The goal of analysis could be expressed thus; Let us invent that which will allow us to live in and continue to build the world, and first of all, the world that is each of us.’[56]

Therefore, in conclusion to the second question as to whether analysis performs its cathartic operation [as if by countertransference] without amputation or sacrifice on the part of the subject of that analysis, there does seem to be some fundamental human right at issue. The right of a woman to avail herself of the language of the feminine; and not just as a surface for the male consciousness, does appear to justify her intervention into the limitations of transference at the level of both discourse and dialogue. In combination, therefore, her psycholinguistic radicalisation against authority in the transferences of the analytic scene, through the idiosemiotic reading of the parole of the subject of analysis and engendered psychic phenomena, may not only be appropriate but plural by necessity.

Reflections in conclusion

Freud’s writings suggest to us that we cannot understand why transferences are so polarised, yet he continued that it was ‘the mightiest instrument of success’ and a ‘massive methodological disadvantage.’[57] At once expressing itself ‘so much more intensely in neurotic people undergoing analysis than those who are not’, whilst equally, representing the ‘most powerful means of resistance’ to the authority of his psychoanalysis.[58] Melanie Klein, on the other hand, felt that play for children performed a vital role in the development of the psychic economy, whilst enabling the analyst via the as if of her play technique to move beyond Freud’s ‘free association’ into an economy of objects. Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) say of her that ‘Klein saw genital, oedipal sexuality in every nook and cranny of the child’s world.’ Then, of course, there is the psycholinguistic radicalism of Irigaray – as if she cuts the golden thread of phallocentric structural comfort invoked by the Freudian and contemporary post-Freudian psychoanalytic discourses. In line with her post-modern contemporaries, Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva, her interventions into gender in psychoanalytical thought also include the semiological subversion of the utterance under analysis, and the limits of engendered authority in transference. Irigaray’s (2002) critique of neutrality in psychoanalytical thought is radical and persuasive when she decisively enunciates ‘the analyst is authorised only by himself.’[59]

 

References 

[1] Laplanche, J. and Pontalis, J.-B., (trans. Nicholson-Smith, D., 1973), The Language of Psycho-analysis, London: Karnac Books, (orig. published 1967), p. 455.

[2] Ibid., p. 273.

[3] Bullock, A., Trombley, S. and Lawrie, A., (eds. 1999) The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (3rd edition), London: Fontana Press, p. 678.

[4] Honderich, T., (ed. 1995), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press

[5] therapist here refers to the generic health professional

[6] Ibid., pp. 2-4.

[7] Greenberg, J.R., and Mitchell, S.A., (1983), ‘Object Relations and Psychoanalytic Models’, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory, Cambridge Mass. (USA) and London, England: Harvard Univ. Press, p. 10.

[8] Ibid., p. 10.

[9] Freud, S., (trans. Strachey, J., 1966-1974), ‘Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, SE. 7, London: Hogarth, p. 116.

[10] Jones, E., (1953) The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, volume 1., London: Hogarth cited in Hinshelwood, R.D., (1991), A dictionary of Kleinian thought, (2nd Ed). London: Free Assoc. Books, p. 463.

[11] Freud, S., (trans. Bance, A. ed. Phillips, A., 2002) ‘On the Dynamics of Transference’ (orig. published 1912) in Wild Analysis, London: Penguin Books, p.22.

[12] Freud, S., (trans. Bance, A. ed. Phillips, A., 2002) ‘Observations on Love in Transference’ (orig. published 1915) in Wild Analysis, London: Penguin Books, syntax added p.67.

[13] Freud, S., (trans. Bance, A. ed. Phillips, A., 2002) ‘On the Dynamics of Transference’ (orig. published 1912) in Wild Analysis, London: Penguin Books, p.21.

[14] Ibid., p. 22.

[15] Ibid., pp. 22-25.

[16] Freud, S., (trans. Bance, A. ed. Phillips, A., 2002) ‘Observations on Love in Transference’ (orig. published 1915) in Wild Analysis, London: Penguin Books, p.75.

[17] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[18] Ibid., p. 78.

[19] Greenberg, J.R., and Mitchell, S.A., (1983), ‘Melanie Klein’, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory, Cambridge Mass. (USA) and London, England: Harvard Univ. Press, p. 119.

[20] Ibid., p. 119.

[21] Ibid., p. 120.

[22] Ibid., p. 119.

[23] Hinshelwood, R.D., (1991), ‘Introduction’, A dictionary of Kleinian thought, (2nd Ed). London: Free Assoc. Books, p. 1.

[24] Ibid., p. 1.

[25] Ibid., p. 2.

[26] Hinshelwood, R.D., (1991), ‘Controversial Discussions’, A dictionary of Kleinian thought, (2ndEd). London: Free Assoc. Books, pp. 253-254.

[27] Ibid., p. 254.

[28] Cf. Klein’s case material concerning ‘Rita’ (1923).

[29] Hinshelwood, R.D., (1991), ‘Internal Objects’, A dictionary of Kleinian thought, (2nd Ed). London: Free Assoc. Books,pp. 68-82.

[30] Ibid., p. 70.

[31] Ibid., p. 71.

[32] Ibid., p. 72.

[33] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

[34] Klein, M., (1935), ‘A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states’, The Writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 1, p. 262, cited in Robert Hinshelwood, (ed. Hinshelwood, R.D., 1991), ‘Internal Objects’, A dictionary of Kleinian thought, (2nd Ed). London: Free Assoc. Books, p. 75.

[35] Segal, H., (1973), ‘The Paranoid-Schizoid Position’, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, London and New York: Karnac Books, p.24.

[36] Ibid., p. 24

[37] Ibid., p.24

[38] Ibid., p.25.

[39] Ibid., p. 25

[40] Segal, H., (1973), ‘Postscript on Technique’, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, London and New York: Karnac Books, p. 120.

[41] Ibid., p. 120.

[42] Ibid., p. 120.

[43] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘On Phantasm and the Verb’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, p. 55.

[44] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘The Poverty of Psychoanalysis; On Some Only Too Pertinent Considerations’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, pp. 205-226.

[45] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘The Utterance in Analysis’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, p. 95.

[46] Ibid., p. 95.

[47] Ibid., p. 95.

[48] Ibid., p. 95.

[49] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘The Limits of Transference’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, p. 237.

[50] Ibid., p. 237.

[51] Ibid., p. 240.

[52] Cf. Neitzsche, F., (trans. Hollingdale, R.J., 1886/1973), Beyond Good and Evil, London: Penguin

[53] Bowie, M., (1991), ‘Symbolic, Imaginary, Real…and True’, Lacan, London: Fontana Press, pp. 94-95.

[54] Cf. Onions, T., (1973The Shorter OED

[55] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘The Limits of Transference’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, p. 246.

[56] Ibid., p. 246.

[57] Freud, S., (trans. Bance, A. ed. Phillips, A., 2002) ‘On the Dynamics of Transference’ (orig. published 1912) in Wild Analysis, London: Penguin Books, p.22.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Irigaray, L., (trans. Schwab, G. 2002), ‘The Poverty of Psychoanalysis; On Some Only Too Pertinent Considerations’, To Speak is Never Neutral, London and New York: Continuum, p. 206.

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